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 Today the federal government, all 50 states, and virtually
 all city and county governments utilize computers. At the
 city and county levels alone, computers are used for some
 450 different computer applications including paying
 employees, sending utility bills, analyzing demographic
 data, routing vehicles, and allocating manpower.1 This
 extensive use of computers is the result of the promised
 payoffs from computerization.
 Early on, Anthony Downs argued that the final payoffs
 from computer use would be either technical or power
 related.2 Technical payoffs would include such things as
 increased availability of information and greater efficiency
 in operational performance. Power payoffs would include
 shifts in the relative resources or influence of different
 groups, such as technical experts gaining increased influ-
 ence over elected officials from their enhanced ability to
 access and use information. It is now known that major
 power shifts have not occurred as a result of computeriza-
 tion. Rather, computer use has tended to reinforce existing
 power relations in organizations.3
 But to what extent have the promised technical payoffs
 been realized? The literature has given a variety of
 answers to this question, and the answers have often been
 in conflict.4 One scholar characterizes the current state of
 the literature as follows:
 Much of the literature still presents hearsay,
 speculation, opinions, or evidence gathered by
 parties with vested political interests.
 Unfortunately, carefully conducted theoretical
 and empirical research studies are still scarce,
 and even these works are frequently plagued
 by incomplete, conflicting and counter intu-
 itive results.5
 This article seeks to overcome such past deficiencies in
 considering the techincal payoffs from computerization.
 First, the data are collected from 42 leading-edge cities in
 the United States in 1976 and from 46 such cities in 1988.
 The data are quantitative and were collected by established
 principles of survey research and sampling design.
 Second, the data include a panel of cities; 37 of the cities
 are in both the 1976 and 1988 databases. The panel data
 from leading-edge cities permit study of the possibility
 that part of the conflicting and vague prior findings on the
 impacts of computerization could be due to the various
 different stages of computerization in the organization(s)
 studied as well as to differences in the stage of the tech-
 nology itself. To be specific, the panel nature of the data
 allow exploration of whether some payoffs come quickly
 from automation whereas others take time. The same can
 be said for problems with computing. The early literature
 on the impacts of computing suggested that computing
 was likely to have many negative effects as well as posi-
 tive benefits.6 Panel data allow exploration of whether
 problems that existed early in computerization persist or
 have been dealt with and minimized over time.
 Third, the analysis focuses on the general payoffs from
 computerization, payoffs that would be relevant to any
 governmental department or task and payoffs that were
 touted in the early days of computerization. This focus
 reduces the possibility that part of the conflicting and
 vague prior findings on the impacts of computerization
 could be due to the choice of technical payoffs studied.
 The following payoffs are examined: increased availability
 Are governments that adopted computers early receiving the payoffs today? Yes, but a major finding of this
 panel (1976-1988) study of 46 U.S. cities is that most payoffs from computerization are not felt immediately.
 Instead they take years to reach fruition. The major payoffs occur in the areas offiscal control, cost avoidance,
 and better interaction with the public. But some anticipated benefits, such as better information for planning and
 managerial control, still have not been realized-even by cities that were on the leading edge of automation in the
 1970s. Moreover, the prospects for future payoffs in these areas are mixed.
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 of information, better information for management con-
 trol, better information for city planning decisions, greater
 efficiency of operational performance, and better interac-
 tion with the public.7 In addition, the study considers
 computerization's possible negative effects dealing with
 the technical quality of information and computer ser-
 vices. The actual measures used in the analysis were
 developed in 1976 based on the common complaints and
 promises regarding computerization heard in the practi-
 tioner, academic, and vendor circles.
 The study hypothesizes that prior studies did not consis-
 tently find technical payoffs from computerization for sev-
 eral reasons other than methodological ones, although
 methodological reasons could be part of the explanation.
 First, most payoffs take time to be realized.
 Computerization of information and tasks is done in
 stages, and there is a learning curve for user personnel as
 well as for the technologists (software development).
 Second, payoffs most clearly are realized in the more sim-
 ple tasks such as recordkeeping rather than across the
 board. Third, some payoffs may be realized only at a
 minimal level even after years of experience by the most
 technologically advanced cities due to the political nature
 of the tasks. For example, payoffs from computerization
 for planning and management decisions are a minor part
 of these tasks given the often overriding influence of intu-
 ition, judgment and politics.
 Data and Methods
 The data for this article were collected as part of two
 studies referred to as URBIS I and URBIS 1:, which were
 conducted through the Public Policy Research
 Organization at the University of California, Irvine, and
 supported by grants from the National Science
 Foundation.8 The method here is derived from the URBIS
 I design. In 1976, information was gathered from 42 cities
 in the United States. These cities were chosen using an
 innovative design to sample different types of cities pur-
 posely rather than to sample randomly all cities per se.
 Through an initial mail survey inquiring about computer
 services in every city over 50,000 in population (N = 403),
 data were collected to stratify cities on six policy vari-
 ables. These included the degree of (1) automation, (2)
 centralization, (3) data integration, (4) technical sophisti-
 cation, (5) user involvement, and (6) charging for services.
 Thus, the sample reflects leading-edge cities, not simply in
 terms of technology but also in terms of computing prac-
 tices.
 Each variable was dichotomized, yielding 64 possible
 combinations. Forty groups out of the possible 64 were
 randomly selected, and then a city in each group was ran-
 domly selected. Two additional cities were added due to
 resource allowance. In 1988 five of the original cities
 were unable to participate again, and therefore new cities
 were added to the original sample. Nine new cities were
 added and were chosen to reflect the single most important
 change in local government computing since the mid-
 1970s-the proliferation of personal computers, especially
 among cities between 50,000 and 99,999 in population.
 Consequently, the 1988 sample represents leading-edge
 cities for that year and thereby permits this research to
 address whether there are payoffs by 1988. The cities
 reflect the diversity, although not proportionately, of
 United States cities in terms of population, region, and
 current state of computing practices (see appendix).
 The methods for this article focus on leading-edge cities
 and the computer users within those cities as predictors of
 where the majority of cities and government employees
 will be in the future. Thus, while the two samples are
 biased toward more technically advanced cities and
 toward those city employees who use computers and
 information systems, the design has a distinct advantage
 for the purpose of this analysis. Specifically, the purpose
 is to chart the payoffs from, and problems with, automa-
 tion. Technically advanced cities by definition would
 potentially be the first to realize generalized payoffs as
 well as problems from computerization since they were
 the first to automate and then to automate extensively.
 Because they had no one to look to and learn from, they
 may actually have experienced more problems. Moreover,
 technically advanced cities would, by definition, have the
 most experience with automation and thus should have the
 best chance to realize benefits while reducing costs over
 time. Finally, this article is also concerned with the future
 payoffs from automation, and thus the sampling frame
 uses cities which are technologically advanced today as
 predictors of the common state of computerization in gov-
 ernment in the future.
 This article uses only the responses of chief executives,
 department managers, and division heads given its focus
 on payoffs. An average of 26 such respondents per city,
 1,185 total, filled out anonymous questionnaires on com-
 puting use in 1988, which is more than an 80% response
 rate. The 1976 data had a 91% response rate.9 Of the
 1988 respondents, 45% had worked for their city for 12 or
 more years, 52% for less than 12 years, with 3% unknown.
 The overall average number of years in their respective
 departments was approximately 12. Consequently, while
 all the respondents had not been in the same cities in 1976,
 a great many of them had been. Moreover, it is not neces-
 sary to have the exact same respondents in 1988 as in
 1976 because the questions were not worded to cover the
 12 years, but only whether computers have had an effect.
 Furthermore, a large array of computer applications were
 introduced into these cities after 1976. Finally, for the
 purposes of this article, responses were aggregated by city
 to reflect the organizational state of computerization as
 viewed by management. (The responses of chief execu-
 tives, department managers, and division heads did not
 differ when analyzed separately.)
 The data are based on the perceptions of these top man-
 agers. It can be argued that perceptions are not necessarily
 the most valid measures of computer payoffs. Yet, top
 managers act on the basis of their perceptions. For exam-
 ple, computer adoption decisions, which this article argues
 will affect future payoffs, are heavily dependent on man-
 agers' perceptions of payoffs. In addition, managers' per-
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 ceptions provide the most direct measure possible for
 some payoffs, such as whether computerized information
 is helpful in identifying problems or providing information
 about employee performance. If the information exists
 and does not reach managers or is not used by them, it is
 not helpful. Moreover, top managers are in positions to
 know whether payoffs are realized because they receive
 reports, budgets, problems, complaints and praise about
 computing. In addition, during the fieldwork in each city,
 managers were consistently asked to back up their percep-
 tions with actual examples where, for instance, computer-
 ized information helped to change a management decision
 or resulted in cost savings. The perception-based data in
 this article complements the pattern of responses in the
 interviews. Furthermore, with their years of firsthand
 experience with computers, the managers, if anything,
 should be less sanguine about computers because it is hard
 to achieve the promised payoffs immediately. For exam-
 ple, one may notice cost savings early on and then forget it
 or discount it as operations, services, and clients naturally
 increase. But if massive computer effects exist, the per-
 ceptual data should reflect them. Complimentarily, aggre-
 gating individual responses to the city level should reduce
 perceptual errors stemming from any single manager's
 short tenure in a department. Finally, given that not all
 respondents may have been around to observe payoffs and
 given that payoffs might be subtle and marginal and thus
 less easy to detect, the data may underrepresent impacts.
 In fact, any perceived improvement from 1976 to 1988
 could be argued to be less than more direct measures
 would obtain.
 Findings About Technical Quality of
 Computerized Information and Computer
 Services
 Before beginning the analysis of the payoffs from com-
 puterization, it is necessary to consider what is an obvious
 given or assumption of computerization; that is, that the
 technical quality of information and the provision of com-
 puter services are good. It is unlikely that cost savings
 will be realized, for instance, if no one uses computerized
 information because it is inaccurate. Then again, the data
 might be accurate, but one rarely refers to them because it
 takes too long to get, e.g., the computer is down, or one
 has low priority, or the data processing staff is just slow.
 Hence, the technical quality of computerized information
 and computer services are key determinants of even the
 possibility of payoffs from computerization, and therefore
 this study begins by considering technical quality and
 accuracy in particular.
 Accuracy is a basic concern in terms of how information
 is kept. If the data are not accurate, they become useless
 or problem plagued. Thus, it is important that computer-
 ized data be as accurate as manual data. While manual
 data is not error free, manual data is the standard. Hence,
 it is essential that computerized data be at least as accurate
 as manual data. The experience of the sample cities is that
 this has been very much the case and has steadily held true
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 over time. Table 1 shows the managers' index of agree-
 ment in 1976 and 1988 with a statement regarding the
 accuracy of information. The median score across all
 managers was "somewhat agree" to "agree" in 1976 and a
 significant change to "nearly always true" in 1988 (see
 Table 1). Thus, managers' rating of the accuracy of com-
 puterized information was high in the mid 1970s and has
 increased with time. While accurate data is essential,
 computerized data also should neither take a long time to
 get nor be difficult to change. Otherwise, any anticipated
 payoffs would be diluted by the poor technical quality of
 manipulating computerized information. Both in terms of
 Table 1
 Technical Quality of Computerized Information
 and Computer Services
 Index of Agreementa
 Item 1976 1988
 Technical Quality of Information:
 Computerized data is as accurate as data in
 manual records and files.b 2.5* 3
 It does not take too long to get the information
 I need from the computer 2 2.5
 Information is not difficult to change or correct
 once it has been put on a computerized file.b 2 2
 Problem IndexC
 DP Problems:
 Slow response of data processing to requests
 for information 1* 1
 Difficulty in getting priority in using
 the computer. 1 * 0
 Foul-ups in day-to-day computer operations. 1 1
 Frequent technical and organizational changes
 in data-processing services. 0 0
 a. Respondents for each city include the mayor, city manager, or chief
 administration department and division heads. The index of agreement
 is the median of the median response within each city across all these
 respondents where individuals' responses were scored as: 0, disagree;
 1, somewhat disagree; 2, somewhat agree; 3, agree, in 1976; and 0,
 almost never true; 1, sometimes true; 2, frequently true; 3, nearly
 always true in 1988. In so building the index, the N in 1976 was 42,
 and in 1988 it was 46.
 b. Question wording was changed for table comparability only. The
 question was actually phrased in the positive in the questionnaire.
 c. The problem index is the median of the median response within each
 city across all top managers, where individuals' responses were scored
 as: 0, not a problem; 1, at times a problem; 2, often a problem; 3, very
 often a problem.
 d.While the median is the same for 1976 and 1988, the median test
 shows a significant difference because the range of scores differed
 between these two years. In 1976, scores ranged from a low of 0 to a
 high of 3; in 1988, the highest score was a 1.
 * Significant at the .05 level or below-determined by an SPSS two-
 sample median test which computes chi-square. The data is ordinal
 and the medians were calculated.
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 quickness of access and correcting of computerized data,
 the managers in the study's cities tended to have had posi-
 tive experiences in 1976 (see Table 1). But, by 1988, they
 experienced no significant improvements in either of these
 two areas (Table 1). Perhaps, the lack of significant
 improvement is due to managers asking for more sophisti-
 cated computer-based information in 1988 than in 1976.
 As their experiences with computers and their capabilities
 have increased, so too might their demands. Or perhaps
 systems, once operational, are inflexible in terms of quick-
 ness of access and ease of correcting data.
 Overall, then, the technical quality of information needed
 to be good from the start if automation was to become the
 wave of the future in cities. The respondents indicate that
 technical quality was and has continued to be good, but
 there is room for improvement.
 Another key technical concern is the quality of the data
 processing operations. Frequent organizational changes,
 foul-ups in the day-to-day computer operation, poor
 response by data processing staff to requests for informa-
 tion or lack of priority can frustrate computer users. If the
 computer always seems to be down or if one has to wait a
 week for information that is needed today, then the accura-
 cy of computerized information becomes meaningless
 since it is not accessible in a timely manner.
 In 1976 such occurrences were perceived to be a problem
 at times (see Table 1). While they represented a low level
 of problems, they were nonetheless pervasive. Today
 computer problems such as poor response time and organi-
 zational changes are still rare. Clearly the priority prob-
 lem has been significantly tempered by the spread of per-
 sonal computers (PCs) and can only get better from the
 continued diffusion of PCs. In addition, organization and
 hardware hassles have remained low even as computer
 services have expanded. Therefore, given that every city
 has some automation and PCs have sharply accelerated the
 rate and level of automation, the authors predict that oper-
 ational problems with data processing services will contin-
 ue to remain minimal. 10
 Given that these technical aspects of computerization are
 uniformly good across U.S. cities, one can now consider
 the extent to which the general payoffs of computerization
 are being achieved. The focus here is on five general pay-
 offs: (1) increased availability of information, (2) better
 information for management control, (3) better informa-
 tion for city planning decisions, (4) greater efficiency of
 operational performance, and (5) better interaction with
 the public.
 Payoffs in Increased Availability of Information
 Information improvements are the basic selling points of
 computers. Entering, storing, and accessing information
 in or through a computer is supposed to make it easier and
 quicker to access information when needed to answer a
 question or to make a decision. One no longer has to
 search file cabinets, make phone calls, or ask someone to
 get information. All one has to do is go to a terminal or
 computer keyboard and search. And this can be done even
 after normal working hours, in a car, or at home in addi-
 tion to at work. Thus, ease of retrieval and time savings
 are two key improvements supposedly stemming from
 computerization. In addition, since information can also
 be entered or changed at ease by those closest to the cur-
 rent situation, data tend to be more current. Furthermore,
 the restructuring capabilities of computers allow for stan-
 dard data to be grouped, broken down, or mathematically
 altered, thereby providing new information.1
 Intriguingly, while the technical quality of computerized
 information was good in the mid-1970s, the basic payoffs
 in better information from computerization were mixed
 (see Table 2). The managers in the study's cities "dis-
 agreed somewhat" over whether new information was
 made available, but "agreed somewhat" that computers
 saved time, computers made it easier to get information,
 and computers provided them with more up-to-date infor-
 mation. By 1988 these managers were frequently and sig-
 nificantly seeing new information payoffs as well as con-
 tinuing to see payoffs in ease of retrieval, timesaving, and
 more up-to-date information (see Table 2). In fact, the
 payoffs in availability of information between 1976 and
 1988 may well be underestimated given the change in
 Table 2
 Computer Impacts on Availability of Information
 Index of Agreementa
 Item 1976 1988
 Availability of Information:
 Computers have made it easier for me
 to get the information I need. 2 2
 Computers save me time in looking for information. 2 2
 The computer provides me with more up-to-date
 information than that previously available. 2 2
 The computer makes new information available
 to me which was not previously available. 1 * 2
 Problem Indexb
 1976 1988
 Information problems:
 Difficulties in accessing computer-based data
 gathered or held by other departments and agencies 1 1
 Computer-based data not available for the
 analysis of specific questions or problems 1 * 2
 a. The agreement is the median of the median response within each city
 across all top managers, where individuals' responses were scored as:
 0, disagree; 1, somewhat disagree; 2, somewhat agree; 3, agree in
 1976; and 0, almost never true; 1, sometimes true; 2, frequently true; 3,
 nearly always true in 1988.
 b. The problem index is the median of the median response within each
 city across all top managers, where individuals' responses were scored
 as: 0, not a problem; 1, at times a problem; 2, often a problem; 3, very
 often a problem.
 * Significant at the .05 level or below determined by the two-sample
 median test.
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 response categories. For instance a "2" in 1976 represent-
 ed "somewhat agree" but in 1988 represented "frequently
 true."
 Such information payoffs are expected to continue as
 cities continue to accelerate their automation. For
 instance, on average these cities plan to automate 57 addi-
 tional applications within the next two years. However,
 experience with computerized information can create an
 unending appetite for data. Given that all data are not
 automated, are not automated in the way one would want,
 or are not available to everyone, some problems with the
 availability of information will continue as dependence on
 computerized information increases (see Table 2, informa-
 tion problems).
 Payoffs in Better Information
 for Management Control
 Beginning in the 1960s, the computer began to be per-
 ceived as a tool for management control.'2 Although a
 number of organizational resources might be computerized
 in the interest of managerial control (e.g., money, person-
 nel, equipment), budget control traditionally has been the
 chief instrument of monetary control and, indirectly, of
 other resource control as well.'3 Some form of budget-
 control automation has existed for years in the nation's
 largest cities. However, it was the urban fiscal crisis of the
 1970s that provided the spark for wider-scale budget-con-
 trol automation.s4 The computer's capacity for assisting
 in budget and managerial control was perceived as a major
 tool for handling the crisis.
 In the mid-1970s computer-based information was con-
 sidered "somewhat useful" in day-to-day expenditure deci-
 sions and in providing the real costs of programs and
 activities and "useful" during the annual budget cycle (see
 Table 3). Computer-based information has remained as
 useful with no significant improvements by 1988.
 On the one hand then, budgetary computerization has
 provided a moderate amount of managerial fiscal control
 which has not increased over time. On the other hand, the
 level of managerial fiscal control resulting from computer-
 ization is inherently limited. This limitation has been
 especially felt since the 1970s when inflation, the energy
 crisis, and the withdrawal of federal monies dramatically
 constrained city governments. Technological improve-
 ments can contribute to managerial fiscal control, but the
 contributions are constrained by outside factors. Given
 these constraints, managerial fiscal control may very well
 be less driven by computerization. For example, a city
 might obtain a ten percent improvement in managerial fis-
 cal control after a major new software package is intro-
 duced; but if a similar city were hit by recession, it might
 only obtain a one percent increase in managerial fiscal
 control from introducing the same software package. But
 if it were not for computerization, the city might have
 experienced a serious decline. In fact, put in this context,
 the steady state in managerial control stemming from
 computerization of budget information since the mid-
 1970s could be actually impressive when weighed against
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 the dramatic increase in constraints that forced budget
 control into crisis control during this time.
 Aside from fiscal issues, computerized information can aid
 in other aspects of managerial control. "Can" is clearly the
 watchword here. Computerized information generally was
 rated "not at all useful" for nonbudgetary aspects of man-
 agerial control by the cities in the mid-1970s with a signifi-
 cant move toward "somewhat useful" in only two personnel
 areas by 1988 (see Table 3). To be specific, when it comes
 to allocating manpower, setting goals, identifying internal
 problems, and assessing employee performance, computer-
 ized information has not lived up to claims of usefulness or
 to its probable potential (see Table 3).
 Why the near failure in these areas? Mainly, applications
 of computers for management control have not yet been
 developed outside the fiscal area. Recordkeeping was and
 is the driving force of most computerization in local gov-
 ernment. Thus information tasks that have a dominant
 recordkeeping component to them, such as budget report-
 ing, tend to be automated first and are the most understood
 and well developed. Complementarily, the only signifi-
 cant increases in usefulness of all computerized manage-
 ment control tasks are in the provision of performance
 Table 3
 Computer Impacts on Management Control and
 Planning Decisions
 Index of Usefulnessa
 Item 1976 1988
 Management Control:
 How useful to you has computer-based information been:
 during the annual budget cycle? 3 3
 for day-to-day expenditure decisions? 2 2
 in providing real costs of programs and activities? 2b 2b
 in allocating manpower? 1* 1.5
 in providing information about performance
 of subordinates? 1*b 1.5b
 in setting realistic goals for the units or
 individuals you supervise? 1 2
 in identifying problems, abuses or
 inefficiencies in the unit you supervise? 1.25 2
 Planning Decisions:
 How useful to you has computer-based information
 been in identifying city problems? 2 2
 How useful to you has computer-based information
 been in determining solutions to city problems? 1.25 1.5
 a. The index of usefulness is the median of the median response within
 each city across all top-manager respondents, where individuals'
 responses were scored as: 0, no computer-based information; 1, not at
 all useful; 2, somewhat useful; 3, useful; 4, very useful.
 b. This item was scored somewhat differently. Responses were scored:
 0, no computer-based information; 1, not at all; 2, yes, in a few cases;
 3, yes, in many cases; 4, yes, in nearly all cases.
 * Significant at the .05 level or below determined by the two-sample
 median test.
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 information and allocating manpower, which are likely to
 be set up in a recordkeeping form (see Table 3).
 Therefore, until better management control applications
 are developed, serious management control payoffs are not
 expected from computerized information, except in the
 fiscal area. Moreover such control payoffs are likely to be
 constrained by the professional versus political nature of
 the city administration. As other published work from the
 URBIS research indicates, the more professional the
 administration is (e.g., the city is headed by a professional
 manager) and the more it follows professional manage-
 ment practices, the more likely the administration supports
 decision making aided by applications such as computer
 models.15
 Payoffs in Better Information for
 City Planning Decisions
 The situation for planning decisions is as poor as it is for
 management control other than fiscal. Managers in the
 sample cities see computer-based information for city
 planning as barely useful in 1976 and the same in 1988
 (see Table 3). The usefulness of computerized data in
 planning, decisions is severely limited by the quality of
 database management applications and especially by the
 political factors that necessarily must be taken into
 account in decision making. For instance, many planning
 decisions require data that identify community conditions
 (e.g., housing supply, occupancy, ownership, condition).
 Such data are or can be automated in most cities. At the
 same time, setting up computer models that identify city
 problems or evaluate solutions to problems is far more
 complex. Such models would require criteria for defining
 problems and evaluating solutions, analysis of data in sev-
 eral files, and information that cannot be automated, such
 as interest group feelings about problems or support for
 various solutions. Moreover, there has been a clear trend
 in planning decisions for well over ten years now to deval-
 ue community statistics and, instead, to emphasize the
 opinions of the affected citizens. Given this trend, along
 with supporting data from this research, it is likely that
 computerized information will have little impact on city
 planning decisions in the near future.
 Payoffs in Greater Efficiency of
 Operational Performance
 Computers are supposed to have their greatest impacts on
 the operational efficiency of governmental departments.'6
 The computer's vast capabilities for storing, retrieving,
 and processing information were expected to pare down
 rapidly the "army of clerks" in city and county halls,
 thereby reducing costs without a loss in service effective-
 ness. However, it has been apparent for some time that
 staff and cost savings from automation occur mainly in
 large-volume, highly repetitive information processing
 tasks such as tax, utility, and other large volume process-
 ing operations. Because many government functions
 involve many varied, small-volume information process-
 ing tasks, the overall efficiency benefits from computing
 Table 4
 Computer Impacts on Efficiency of Operational
 Performance and the Effectiveness of Public
 Service
 Index of Agreementa
 Item 1976 1988
 Efficiency of Operational Performance:
 Cost Savings-
 Where they have been applied, computers
 have reduced the number of people
 necessary to perform tasks in my department. 1.5 1
 Where they have been applied, computers have
 reduced the cost of department operations. 1.5* 2
 Cost Avoidance-
 Computers allow departments to handle a
 greater volume of service without corresponding
 increases in cost. 2 2
 Cost Problem-
 High cost of computer use. 1 *b ob
 Effectiveness of Public Service:
 Computers have made it easier to handle routine
 citizen requests for information. 2 3
 Computers seldom make things hard for citizens
 because mistakes in computer records take a long
 time to correct.c 1 * 2
 Citizen complaints about this department seldom
 are related to foul-ups or problems we have with
 the computer 2.5 3
 a. The index of agreement is the median of the median response within
 each city across all top-manager respondents, where individuals'
 responses were scored: 0, disagree; 1, somewhat disagree; 2, some-
 what agree; 3, agree.
 b. The problem index is the median of the median response within each
 city across all top managers, where individuals' responses were scored
 as: 0, not a problem; 1, at times a problem; 2, often a problem; 3, very
 often a problem.
 c. The wording of these questions was changed for table comparability.
 The question actually said "sometimes" instead of "seldom."
 * Significant at the .05 level or below determined by the two-sample
 median test.
 have been considerably less than expected.'7 This situa-
 tion is reflected in the perceptions of the managers, who
 "somewhat disagree" that computers produce staff reduc-
 tions and "somewhat agree" that computers produce cost
 savings (see Table 4). Yet the dashed hopes for large cost
 savings from most municipal automation can be replaced
 by the satisfactions from cost avoidance which the man-
 agers "somewhat agree" has occurred (see Table 4). In
 fact, no city disagreed or even somewhat disagreed with
 this payoff.
 The reason why there have not been significant, observ-
 able staff savings may be attributable to the fact that (1)
 computerization allows new services to be offered as well
 as greater volume of work to be performed, i.e., more
 work done with about the same size staff, and (2) creates
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 the need for new jobs in many departments to support the
 computer applicationss. Therefore, if operational effi-
 ciency is improved through computerization, it is
 improved by avoiding higher personnel costs and not nec-
 essarily by cutting present or preautomation costs. Finally,
 only those information processing tasks that experience
 higher volume growth or offer new services realize major
 cost avoidance. While staff and cost savings from com-
 puter use may not be immediately apparent, managers are
 no longer concerned about the "high cost of computer use"
 (see Table 2). It may be that they feel the benefits out-
 weigh the costs or that the costs of computer use have
 declined substantially.
 Payoffs in Better Interaction with the Public
 The promised benefits of computerization were many,
 and they were directly pitched to appeal to managers and
 mayors. Citizens were also said to benefit for they would
 live in a better managed and more effective and efficient
 city. Still, these are indirect citizen benefits and collective
 goods. Yet, some direct benefits accrue to citizens; when
 they individually initiate contacts with the *city.
 Computers can make citizens' requests for information
 easier to the extent that computerization has increased the
 availability of information while maintaining technical
 quality (see Tables 1 and 2). In 1976 and 1988 citizens
 were somewhat realizing this benefit from computeriza-
 tion (see Table 4). In addition, while computerization
 increased during this time period, there was a perceived
 significant decrease in citizens' frustrations with comput-
 erized data (see Table 4). Thus, while automation can
 increase government effectiveness and efficiency, at times
 an intangible benefit to citizens, it is important that it also
 improve direct government-citizen relations, which is a
 very tangible benefit to citizens.
 Conclusion
 The computer industry promoted computers with stories
 of untold benefits that would result from the introduction
 of computers into the workplace. Little was said about the
 technical quality of computerized information. Very
 quickly, automating workplaces realized that more ques-
 tions should have been asked about the accuracy and ease
 of manipulation of automated files. Then there were also
 the unanticipated organizational and hardware problems.
 Still, while such problems tended to come as a surprise,
 they were not major problems in terms of their frequency
 and manageability. Admittedly, they were sometimes a
 source of major frustration for employees and citizens
 alike.
 Good technical quality of information is an essential
 characteristic of computerized information, but in itself it
 is not a benefit or payoff. On the most fundamental level,
 computerization was supposed to increase the availability
 of information. Yet, by the mid-1970s the payoffs in bet-
 ter information were mixed.
 In 1976 what specific payoffs were United States cities
 perceived to be receiving from computerization? Answer:
 more fiscal control, some cost avoidance, better interac-
 tion with the public, and a bare improvement in informa-
 tion for planning decisions (see Table 5). What payoffs
 were these cities perceived to be receiving? Answer:
 overall improvements in availability of information, infor-
 Table 5
 Summary of Payoffs from Computerization
 Significant Improvement
 By 1988
 1976a 1988a # dimensions # significant
 Increased availability of information Mixed Yesb 6 lup
 down
 Better information for management control
 Fiscal control Somewhat useful to useful Somewhat useful to useful 3 0
 Personnel matters Not at all Toward
 somewhat useful 2 2
 Setting goals, identifying problems Not at all Not at all 2 0
 Better information for planning decisions Barely Barely 2 0
 Greater efficiency
 Cost savings Questionable Mixed 2 1
 Cost avoidance Somewhat Somewhat 1 0
 Better interaction with the public Better Better 3 1
 a. The words are a qualitative characterization of the meaning of the score. See previous tables for the actual responses used for each measure.
 b. An improvement is noted due to the change in response categories in 1988 that distort the tests of significance.
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 mation for management control in nonfiscal areas, and
 cost savings (see Table 5). That is not a good return given
 all the high expectations. But in 1976, while 95 percent
 of all United States cities over 50,000 in population were
 automated, the automation was not extensive; it tended to
 be concentrated in a few selected departments, such as
 police, finance, and public works. Thus, the payoffs from
 automation could be argued to be minimal due to the low
 level of automation.
 However, by 1988, one could no
 longer use as an excuse for the poor
 payoffs that few departments were
 automated. Today, based on the
 1985 survey of all U.S. cities over
 50,000 in population, cities average
 84 applications. They are distribut-
 ed across nearly all city depart-
 ments, and 84 percent of the man-
 agers as well as staff indicate that
 their work involves major interaction with computers.18
 So have the payoffs been realized with the extensive com-
 puterization of cities? The answer appears to be a quali-
 fied yes, but there is still much room for improvement
 (see Table 5). By 1988, cities were experiencing the most
 payoffs in the areas of fiscal control, cost avoidance, and
 better interaction with the public (see Table 5). A minimal
 level of payoffs were observed in nonfiscal management
 control and planning decisions. Some cost savings were
 cited as were payoffs in increased availability of informa-
 tion (see Table 5).
 And what further payoffs from automation does the
 future hold for U.S. cities and governments in general?
 Newer and more up-to-date information that is easier to
 access will be the hallmark of future automation (see
 Table 1). More available information was the basic selling
 point of computers, and it is generally perceived to have
 lived up to those promises. This finding is important
 because record searching is the common denominator of
 all computer tasks.19 Another sizeable payoff is better
 interaction with the public. While this may be considered
 only as a nice "side dividend" from automation, positive
 benefits were received early and continued to improve
 (Table 5). Another payoff now and in the future is cost
 avoidance (see Table 5). In contrast, net cost savings are
 still low (Table 5). It appears that probably high volume
 tasks and ones which can offer new services are the only
 major beneficiaries of direct cost savings. Finally, while
 better information for fiscal control was an early payoff,
 there is clearly room for improvement although it appears
 at first puzzling that no significant amount has taken place
 in the last 12 years (Table 5). In actuality, we hypothesize
 that the steady state from 1976 to 1988 may be impressive
 when weighed against the major financial constraints in
 cities that occurred in the late 1970s. Moreover, we are
 confident that more sophisticated analysis of financial data
 can result in greater fiscal control as the fiscal crunch of
 cities is reduced and given that some cities have experi-
 enced strong fiscal control improvements. But we are less
 confident that more extensive and intensive computeriza-
 tion in the federal government would have similar effects
 on fiscal control given the looming deficits.
 Newer and more up-to-date
 information that is easier to
 access will be the hallmark
 of future automation.
 In contrast, the payoffs from automation in regard to non-
 fiscal management control and planning decisions have
 been barely realized even in leading-edge cities by 1988
 (Table 5). This dismal situation is further constrained by
 technical and practical limitations. The technical limita-
 tions stem from the quality of database management appli-
 cations. The practical limitations are that databases and
 models do not tell one what should be done. Databases
 can help to focus decision making on the critical issues,
 and models can aid the decision-
 making process by imposing a dis-
 cipline on it. For example, models
 require users to specify precisely
 the assumptions they are making
 and the basic facts of the decision
 situation and then to calculate the
 consequences. But a computer
 analysis can only tell a city, for
 example, that one-person patrol
 cars are more cost effective then two-person cars. The
 decision to go to one-person cars has to be balanced with
 officer safety concerns and union demands, factors that are
 hard to fit meaningfully into computer models. In
 essence, political judgment and insight are still key to
 good management decisions and cannot be supplanted by
 computerization. Planners and policy makers are especial-
 ly cognizant of this reality. Thus, major payoffs in nonfis-
 cal management control and planning decisions are not
 expected in the near future although there definitely is
 room for improvement.
 In conclusion, based on this longitudinal panel study of
 37 leading-edge cities in the United States, the expected
 payoffs from automation have been slow to be realized,
 but that may be the nature of the "beast." Yet there is a
 potential for future improvements. Such improvements
 can be achieved, as demonstrated by a few leading-edge
 cities. However, given the data and their admittedly per-
 ceptual nature, managers should continue to focus com-
 puter dollars on applications that have a large recordkeep-
 ing component such as financial, personnel, and land
 records, as well as utility bills, traffic tickets, etc. More
 sophisticated applications, such as those information sys-
 tems which set and measure goals whether internally (to
 departments) or externally (to larger community planning
 decisions), appear to be a long way away from delivery of
 major payoffs if, in fact, the political nature of these appli-
 cation tasks will ever allow them to be dramatically affect-
 ed by computerization. Finally, data accuracy and accessi-
 bility to data are necessary preconditions for success, but
 they do not guarantee success early if, at times, at all.
 The longitudinal nature, as well as sampling frame of this
 data, appears to be advantageous for sorting out some of
 the conflicting and incomplete findings of prior theoretical
 and empirical studies. Yet, future research needs to
 explore how the attitudes of management, as well as the
 organizational structure, impact the payoffs from automa-
 tion.
 Equally important, future research should take a more
 micro approach by concentrating on the automation pay-
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 offs in specific types of information processing tasks.
 This more micro level of analysis could target payoffs
 stemming from specialized software as well as from varia-
 tions in tasks themselves. It can also focus on questions of
 productivity. The macro approach taken in the present
 article can mask and does not attempt to address payoffs
 and problems unique to different information processing
 tasks in government. In addition, a micro approach could
 include harder measures of payoffs.
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 Appendix
 1986 Population of Cities in the URBIS Study
 City Population City Population
 Albany 101,727 Milwaukee 636,212
 Atlanta 425,022 New Orleans 557,515
 Austin 345,496 New Rochelle 70,794
 Baltimore 786,775 Newton 83,622
 Bellevue 73,903 Oshkosh 49,620
 Bloomington 81,831 Paterson 137,970
 Boulder 76,685 Philadelphia 1,688,210
 Brockton 95,172 Phoenix 789,704
 Burbank 84,625 Portsmouth 104,577
 Charlotte 314,447 Provo 74,108
 Chesapeake 114,486 Quincy 84,743
 Cleveland 573,822 Richardson 72,496
 Costa Mesa 82,562 Riverside 170,876
 Evansville 130,486 Sacramento 275,741
 Ft. Lauderdale 153,279 San Francisco 678,974
 Grand Rapids 181,843 San Jose 629,442
 Hampton 122,617 Seattle 493,846
 Kansas City 448,159 Spokane 171,300
 Lancaster 54,725 St. Louis 453,000
 Las Vegas 165,000 Stockton 149,779
 Lincoln 171,932 Tampa 271,523
 Long Beach 361,334 Warren, MI 161,134
 Miami Beach 96,298 Warren, OH 56,629
 Comparison of 46 Study Cities With All Cities 50,000 and Over: Structural and Technological Policies
 All Cities
 46 Cities 50,000 and Over
 (N = 46) (N = 351)
 Mean Standard Deviation Mean Standard Deviation
 Degree of automation
 (total applications operational) 110.3 49.9 84.1 44.3
 Degree of decentralization
 of computing resources
 (number of installations) 1.9 1.4 1.4 1.2
 Degree of user involvement
 in design 2.5 .6 2.4 .6
 Charging policy .4 .5 .3 .4
 Degree of computer expenses
 (number of years DP in city) 21.4 7.7 18.2 8.3
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